CCEW – a climate change and extreme weather events only concerning committee – full length reasoning

Climate change is one of the most severe crises we are and will be facing, and therefore climate change mitigation and adaptation should be a global focus. To set an example, I here propose the opportunity for Germany to implement a committee only dealing with climate change and extreme weather events. The advantage of such committee is to persistently path a way towards a more sustainable future [1].

‘To overcome the limits of both central leadership and locally fragmented decentralization’ [2], a combination of an overarching committee, focusing on persistence and implementation of mitigation, with sub-committees dealing with local adaptation measures and fostering initiatives might be an opportunity to enhance collaboration across scales and act for the overall best.

 

As speaking of reshaping and structuring a new position, the following points need to be considered:

Hierarchy: The implementation of a hierarchical system makes sense to divide mitigation and adaptation action and to propose a clearly structured concept. While climate-change mitigation is a long-term process which needs to be induced in the same manner – or, to be more precise, can be handled as a more global procedure – , climate adaptation is a more local and short-term process which involves pro-action but also to a large extend reaction to forced events.

Climate change mitigation is an issue concerning the globe, and therefore the committee for climate mitigation should be working on a national level [2]. This makes sure to have a federal oversight, efforts would be equally distributed, and it would set the base for favoring conditions [3]. These include institutionalization, further affecting to ‘provide formal guide lines and informal behavioural norms that enhance predictability, establish order and, at times, promote cooperation’ [4]. Following the ‘collective action model’, proposed by Underdal [3], this would make sure to sustain, focus, energy, and commitment.

When focusing on adaptation, however, a more local instance would be more meaningful. This is foremost due to the more local impacts of climate change which requires specialized and fitting responses which can also be implemented by smaller groups. Smaller groups make sure to keep a high level of flexibility, diversity and interconnection [3]. Furthermore, this induces a tendency of ‘more favourable ratio of private to collective goods’ with a more quickly show of the effects of adaptation measures [3].

 

Innovation Role:

To make sure that innovation is promoted, collaborative forms of policy making and interactions to institutional entrepreneurs should be fostered [5]. Policy entrepreneurs can be seen as catalysers for adaptation in both reactive (after extreme events) and proactive contexts, and local decision makers are more prone to engage to avoid local risks [6]. This can lead to that policy changes might be pursued at a more local level, even when blocked at a more global level [7]. Consequently, they can also act as linkages between formal and informal networks, and, at this interface can become even more important [6].

 

Composition: The composition of the committee, consisting of one, overarching mitigation and a few adaptation sub-committees, is planned as follows:

Each committee consists of a set of nature-based scientists, social scientists, and economists with a ratio of 2:1:1 since it concerns a physical underlying issue. The wording “scientist” here means a person with a sufficient background to grasp, explain and communicate the current issues, and to be able to evolve towards a more sustainable future. These positions preferably should not be taken by other types of stakeholders (representing common or private interests) or government officials [8]. The idea behind the composition is to include knowledge from all relevant fields and integrate and promote interdisciplinary research and close knowledge gaps. Furthermore, it should promote the committee to communicate with relevant fields and elaborate on further solutions. This framework should leverage participatory rights, especially in the form of elections (democratic structure), and offers transparent, and regionally accountable institutions of permanence [9].

Additional, there will be one person voted for which is only responsible for checking applications of innovations which might be coming from the public or from certain companies. In polycentric climate governance, “local initiatives share and transfer knowledge, get supported by transnational networks, and secure compliance with local democratic preferences,” [10] which underscores the value of an elected innovation-scouter who bridges community-driven ideas, public innovation, and regional decision-making.

 

Election: The election is differs regarding the mitigation and the adaptation sub – committees. However, the election cycle should remain the same.

The election for the mitigation committee would happen on a national scale, whereas the adaptation committees would be voted for regionally. The division into different regions would hereby depend on the most likely to happen climate risks, according to the catchment areas as division factors for the Dutch Water Authorities [11]. The clusters which would form due to differing initial conditions and varying impacts would then be seen as one region of the same adaptation framework for which one committee will be voted. The size of the area should be feasible, meaning that not each valley with a catchment area of a stream is accounted for possible flooding if the overall surrounding area is prone to another climate impact.

The election cycle will happen every four years, such as the usual election cycle [12], and the election cycle of the WBGU [9].

The election itself is planned to happen for the sub-committees such that all inhabitants in the region of one sub-committee can vote for a selection of candidates (fulfilling the requirements). The advantage of democratic elections is that everyone’s participation is ensured and this, in turn could lead to further interest and action of the public regarding adaptation policies [10]. Consequently, more diverse ideas and projects can be proposed and, if sensible, also implemented.

 

Interaction:

Apart from the internal election cycle and interdisciplinarity within the committee, there is also a regularly happening knowledge exchange planned to ensure an up-to-date measure planning and implementation. The form of knowledge exchange could be the yearly happening European Geoscience Union Conference [13], and of course the incorporation of the latest report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [14]. Interaction, however, is not only meant in a way that the committees should further increase knowledge, but also that seminars, ‘Public engagement events’ and ‘science-policy-events’ [15] should be promoted.

 

Tasks: The committee is not meant to be just advisory, but an active, and integrative institution. This again, is being done different for the mitigation committee than for the adaptation sub – committees.

For the mitigation committee, the incentive of the Ecologic Institute, to have the committee as ‘a combination of watchdog, reliable information provider and stakeholder‑outreach functions’ can be applied [8]. This involves the embedment of regular input of current science and revision of the current state of mitigation action and effects  [1].  However, the tasks of this overarching committee should be even expanded to also implementing the plans offered.

Concerning the adaptation sub – committees,  the focus is more on local impact, action and effect. The themes which are subject to tasks of the sub – committees might even ‘include health, civil protection, transport, energy, water, agriculture, spatial planning, finance, forestry and local or regional development’ [16]. Of course, horizontal interaction, meaning the contact to other regions with the same climate impacts, or even with varying , is an additional task to be fulfilled. Further, also vertical interaction (meaning with the mitigation committee) plays a crucial role for conformity and reaching overarching goals, and for ‘cost-effectiveness of actions’ [17]. However, the interaction to small-scale innovations, ideas and partners is as important for maximizing possible adaptation action. Therefore, involving sectoral processes, such as the german ‘Deichamt’ or similar institutions, but also with stakeholders and entrepreneurs is meaningful for maintaining a sustainable pathway of adaptation.

Financing: To ensure the sustainability and effectiveness of a dedicated climate committee with both mitigation and adaptation responsibilities, a robust and diversified financing strategy is required.

At the national level, it is essential to secure fixed budget allocations within the federal framework. Germany’s Klimaschutzgesetz, for example, sets a precedent by earmarking funds specifically for climate action, thereby ensuring institutional continuity and clear mandates [1].

In addition to national funding, leveraging European Union climate finance mechanisms such as the European Green Deal, the LIFE Programme and the Just Transition Fund can provide substantial project-based and capacity-building support, particularly for regional adaptation sub-committees [18]. Furthermore, allocating a proportion of revenues from carbon pricing instruments such as emissions trading schemes (ETS) or carbon taxes to the committee can generate transparent and sustainable funding.

Finally, the Committee could organize competitive innovation support programs to promote citizen-led and entrepreneurial climate solutions and integrate new ideas into broader strategies. A dedicated funding coordination unit within the national committee could improve access to these different sources and maximize their impact.

 

 

Sources:

[1] Chapter 13: National and sub-national policies and institutions

[2] Gregorio et al., 2019, Multi-level governance and power in climate change policy networks, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2018.10.003

[3] Underdal, 2010, Complexity and challenges of long-term environmental governance, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.02.005

[4] Anguelovski et al., 2011, Something borrowed, everything new: innovation and institutionalization in urban climate governance, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2010.12.017

[5] Wolfram et al., 2018, Learning in urban climate governance: concepts, key issues and challenges, 10.1080/1523908X.2018.1558848

[6] Chapter 17: Decision-Making Options for Managing Risk | Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability

[7] Montran et al., 2009, Policy Entrepreneurship and Policy Change, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.2009.00329.x

[8] Climate Governance Systems in Europe: the role of national advisory bodies | Ecologic Institute

[9] German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), 2011, World in Transition – A Social Contract for Sustainability, http://www.wbgu.de

[10] Kellner et al., 2024, Polycentric Climate Governance: The State, Local Action, Democratic Preferences, and Power—Emerging Insights and a Research Agenda, https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00753

[11] The-Dutch-water-authority-model.pdf

[12] Electoral period – The Federal Returning Officer

[13] EGU – Meetings – Conference series

[14] Sixth Assessment Report — IPCC

[15] EGU – Policy – EGU science-policy events

[16] Step 1.3 Setting up governance structures to support adaptation

[17] Chapter 18: Climate Resilient Development Pathways | Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability

[18] EU programmes | EU Funding & Tenders Portal

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