How is it possible that the German government continues to spend billions of euros on subsidies for fossil fuels (Zapf 2023)? How is it possible that new gas terminals are still being built in Germany in 2026 (Bundeswirtschaftsministerium 2026)? And how is it possible that at the last COPs, there were more representatives from lobbyist associations than from the regions that are most severely affected by climate change (Transparency International 2024, p. 17)?
And is a future possible (and plausible) where all these facts are not true anymore?
For my poster, I would like to explore the question of how a future German climate policy could look like if there were significantly stricter regulations on lobbying for fossil fuels. I would like to place particular emphasis on the issue of the current expansion of gas in Germany and what role lobbyism plays in that. I want to look at the impact, which the new gas terminals have on the climate, and whether they can be the bridging technology away from coal as they are proclaimed to be (Transparency International 2024, p. 13)? I want to analyse the dynamics which are responsible for the fact that there are still so many subsidies for fossil fuels today, and what factors are preventing the transition away from them. And finally I would like to pose the question how the influence of negative climate lobbyism can be minimised in a democracy?
For a strategy that examines communication and implementation, this topic offers the opportunity to address either the phase-out of fossil gas more specifically or the stricter regulation of lobbying in the fossil fuel sector.
References:
Bundeswirtschaftsministerium (2026): Erdgasversorgung in Deutschland. https://www.bundeswirtschaftsministerium.de/Redaktion/DE/Artikel/Energie/gas-erdgasversorgung-in-deutschland.html (last accessed 29.04.2026).
Transparency International Deutschland e.V. (2024): Klimaschutz statt Lobbymacht. In: Scheinwerfer. Das Magazin gegen Korruption. Dez. 2024, 29. Jg.
Zapf, M. (2023): Wo fossile Energien am stärksten subventioniert werden. In: Capital.
Additional references:
Errichiello, G., Falcone, P. & L. Popoyan (2025): Navigating climate policy: The influence of lobbying trends and narratives in Europe. In: Environmental Science & Policy 163, S. 103974. DOI: 10.1016/j.envsci.2024.103974.
Gentile, G. & J. Gupta (2025): Orchestrating the narrative: The role of fossil fuel companies in delaying the energy transition. In: Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 212, S. 115359. DOI: 10.1016/j.rser.2025.115359.
LobbyControl e.V. (2023): Die Pipelines in die Politik. Die Macht der Gaslobby in Deutschland.
Schott, S. & M. Schreurs (2020): Climate and Energy Politics in Canada and Germany: Dealing with Fossil Fuel Legacies. In: Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55.
The idea of stricter regulations on lobbying for fossil fuels is a very clear strategy, and the example of gas subsidies and the narrative of “gas as a bridge technology” shows how lobby groups shape policy narratives that remain scientifically contested.
I would be careful not to frame the issue in a technocratic way in which scientific evidence directly dictates policy and lobbying appears as the main obstacle. But showing how lobbying gives disproportionate weight to certain stakeholders gives you a strong argument from the standpoint of coproduction and democratic legitimacy.
Definitely a interesting and relevant topic. I’m excited to see how your poster develops 🙂